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the	twentieth	century.	
	
	
Simon	J	Lock,	Department	of	Science	and	Technology	Studies,	UCL	
	
Abstract	
This	paper	considers	the	impact	of	Snow’s	Two	Culture’s	thesis	on	debates	about	the	
place	of	science	and	scientists	in	society	in	the	latter	part	of	the	twentieth	century.	
Debates	concerned	with	the	public	understanding	of	science	and	the	‘science	wars’,	
both	of	which	relied	to	some	extent	on	the	dividing	of	society	into	‘two	cultures’,	are	
contextualised	within	longer	efforts	by	scientists	to	popularise	definitions	of	science	
and	society	and	their	relationship	with	other	epistemic	communities.	This	paper	
argues	that	we	should	think	about	all	these	episodes	as	part	of	ongoing	rhetorical	
boundary	work,	reflective	of	strains	and	stressors	on	science	as	an	institution.		The	
two	cultures	debate	has	provided	one	powerful	rhetorical	device,	amongst	many,	for	
ongoing	boundary	work	to	establish	or	question	science	as	the	dominant	form	of	
knowledge	in	society	and	delineate	who	is	allowed	to	speak	for	it,	and	wield	its	
power.	
	
	
Introduction	
	
In	this	paper	I	want	to	consider	the	impact	of	Snow’s	Two	Culture’s	thesis	on	debates	
about	the	place	of	science	and	scientists	in	society	in	the	latter	part	of	the	twentieth	
century.	In	particular	the	way	in	which	the	idea	of	‘two	cultures’,	with	science	on	one	
side	and	other	forms	of	knowledge	on	the	other,	has	provided	a	powerful	rhetorical	
device	for	ongoing	boundary	work	between	science	and	other	cultural	territories.	
Snow’s	concern	as	a	scientist	and	policy	maker	was	on	the	gulf	of	understanding	
between	those	with	a	literary	intellectual	or	humanities	background	and	those	
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trained	to	think	scientifically.	This	paper	will	document	how	in	the	1990s	his	rhetoric	
both	continued	to	be	mobilised	by	scientist	and	literary	intellectuals,	but	also	
underpinned	the	surrounding	UK	context:	debates	concerned	with	the	public	
understanding	of	science	and	skirmishes	between	social	scientists	(Snow’s	proposed	
bridging	‘third	culture’	and	scientists	in	what	later	became	called	the	‘science	wars’).		
	
Science	and	its	epistemic	and	cultural	boundaries	
	
The	work	of	sociologist	Thomas	Gieryn	(1983,	1995,	1999),	argues	that	we	should	
view	debates	and	statements	made	by	scientists	about	science	as	rhetorical	
boundary	work.	Boundary	work,	according	to	Gieryn,	‘occurs	as	people	contend	for,	
legitimate,	or	challenge	the	cognitive	authority	of	science	–	and	the	credibility,	
prestige,	power,	and	material	resources	that	attend	such	a	privileged	position’	(p.	
405).	Demarcations	of	science	from	non-science	are	driven	by	a	practical	‘social	
interest	in	claiming,	expanding,	protecting,	monopolising,	usurping,	denying,	or	
restricting	the	cognitive	authority	of	science’	(Gieryn	1983,	405).	Gieryn’s	early	
formulation	of	the	concept	of	boundary	work	focused	on	the	rhetorical	style	with	
which	scientists	(and	non-scientists)	describe	science	and	its	surrounding	epistemic	
terrains	for	the	public	and	its	political	authorities,	often	hoping	to	enlarge	the	
material	and	symbolic	resources	of	scientists	or	to	defend	professional	autonomy. 
The	two	cultures	debate	between	Snow	and	Leavis	can,	and	should,	be	viewed	in	this	
manner.	The	truth	or	falsity	of	their	claims	are	of	less	interest	to	us	as	are	the	claims	
being	mobilised	and	the	ways	in	which	they	attempt	to	construct	and	deconstruct	
the	professional	and	cultural	authority	of	each	‘side’.			 
	
Further,	ideas	concerning	popularisation	and	communication	were	central	to	Snow’s	
concerns.	Indeed,	as	media	scholar	van	Dijck	has	argued,	‘implied	in	Snow’s	
argument	of	“bridging	the	gap”	between	arts	and	sciences	was	the	dire	need	to	
translate	between	expert	and	lay	communities.’	(Van	Dijck	2003,	181)	Though	all	
acts	of	popularisation	are	concerned	with	the	transfer	information	from	expert	to	
non-expert,	they	are	also	in	Gieryn’s	formulation	also	to	do	with	identity	
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construction	of	epistemic	domains	and	professional	identities	in	public	sphere.	Thus,	
as	I	have	argued	elsewhere,	debates	about	the	public	understanding	of	science	in	
the	1980s	were	not	new	so	much	as	they	repeated	older	institutional	responses	to	
concerns	about	the	relationship	between	science	and	the	public	(Lock,	2009).		
Indeed,	Gieryn	himself	has	argued	that	John	Tyndall	used	his	prominent	position	as	
Superintendent	at	the	Royal	Institution	to	popularise	a	variety	of	ideological	
arguments	to	justify	scientists’	requests	for	greater	public	support.	Tyndall’s	
Presidential	address	to	the	British	Association	in	1874,	was	boundary	work:	an	
attempt	to	deny	the	authority	of	religious	beliefs	over	natural,	scientifically	derived	
ones,	and	by	extension	fighting	for	cultural	authority	and	resources	for	science	
(Barton,	1987).	
	
One	can	equally	consider	the	founding	of	the	British	Association	for	the	
Advancement	of	Science	(BAAS)	in	1831	and	find	reformers	in	the	Royal	Society	who	
believed	the	solution	to	greater	professional	identity	and	more	importantly	greater	
resources	for	science,	was	to	establish	an	association	‘for	reviving	science	in	England’	
(David	Brewster	to	Charles	Babbage,	in	Morell	and	Thackray	1981,	50).	Thus	a	deficit	
of	understanding	or	attitude	was	perceived	and	also	implicitly	a	link	between	public	
feeling	and	support	for	science	and	government	support	was	established.	
Popularisation	of	science	was	seen	as	the	way	to	manage	the	relationship,	or	
boundary,	between	these	two	spheres:	public	and	science.	
 
Almost	sixty	years	later,	we	find	similar	concerns	about	the	lack	of	public	recognition	
of	science	as	the	President	of	the	BAAS,	John	Burdon-Sanderson,	at	its	Annual	
Meeting	in	Nottingham	in	1893,	argued:	
		
“It	is	not	the	fault	of	governments,	but	of	the	nation,	that	the	claims	of	science	
are	not	recognised.	We	have	against	us	an	overwhelming	majority	of	the	
community,	not	merely	of	the	ignorant,	but	of	those	who	regard	themselves	
as	educated,	who	value	science	only	in	so	far	as	it	can	be	turned	into	money	…	
” (Burdon-Sanderson	1893)	
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In	the	twentieth	century	we	can	find	again	similar	sentiments	being	made	by	
scientists	in	the	1930s	(Collins	1981),	and	in	the	following	decade	the	first	use	of	the	
term	‘public	understanding’	as	the	British	Association’s	conference,	‘Science	and	the	
Citizen:	The	Public	Understanding	of	Science’	in	1943,	held	at	the	Royal	Institution,	
where	J.G.	Crowther	argued	that	“a	hundred	years	ago,	it	was	desirable	that	the	
people	should	know	about	science:	to-day	it	is	necessary	for	survival”.	Calling	for	a	
“more	professional	and	systematic”	approach	to	the	“explanation	and	appreciation	
of	science”,	he	argued	that	scientists	could	no	longer	leave	this	task	to	“occasional	
and	amateur	activity”	if	we	were	to	“look	forward	to	a	scientific	civilisation	
supported	by	democratic	approval,	understanding	and	participation”	(Advancement	
of	Science	1943).	These	are	but	a	few	of	many	similar	examples	whereby	scientists’	
calls	for	greater	popularisation	of	science	and	a	greater	appreciation	and	
understanding	of	science,	can	be	seen	as	attempts	to	carve	out	and	expand	a	role	for	
science	as	a	way	of	knowing	and	as	having	a	more	prominent	role	in	cultural	and	
political	life.	
	
Similarly,	Snow’s	argument	about	the	gulf	between	scientists	and	literary	
intellectuals	was	not	new	in	1959.	American	literary	critic	Lionel	Trilling,	for	example,	
has	argued	that	the	debate	between	Snow	and	Leavis	in	the	mid-twentieth	century	
should	be	seen	as	a	‘re-run’	of	the	debate	at	end	of	nineteenth	century	between	T.	
H.	Huxley	and	Matthew	Arnold	(Trilling,	1967).	Huxley	had	argued	that	“the	great	
majority	of	educated	Englishmen”	believed	that	“the	man	who	has	learned	Latin	and	
Greek,	however,	little,	is	educated;	while	he	who	is	versed	in	other	branches	of	
knowledge,	however	deeply,	is	a	more	or	less	respectable	specialist,	not	admissible	
into	the	cultured	caste”	(Huxley	1880,	141-2).	The	two	cultures	debate	therefore	
forms	part	of	such	wider	and	ongoing	boundary	work	concerned	with	expanding	the	
cultural	authority	of	scientists.	
	
	
Two	Cultures	revisited?	The	public	understanding	of	science		
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It	is	probably	no	coincidence	that	at	the	same	time	as	Snow’s	lecture	in	the	UK	the	
term	‘scientific	literacy’	was	coined	in	the	United	States.	Similar	contemporaneous	
arguments	put	forward	by	anthropologist	Margaret	Mead	show	that	the	‘Two	
Cultures’	debate	was	not	simply	a	British	preoccupation.	Where	Snow	had	
concerned	himself	largely	with	literary	intellectuals	in	positions	of,	or	who	had	
influence	over	people	with	authority,	Mead	was	concerned	with	what	she	perceived	
as	a	growing	alienation	of	lay	people	from	the	worlds	of	science	and	technology.	She	
suggested	that	a	‘schismogenic	process’	was	taking	place	in	Western	culture,	which	
could	only	be	stopped	by	the	discovery	of	‘new	educational	and	communication	
devices’	that	would	be	able	to	bridge	the	gulf	between	‘the	specialized	practitioners	
of	a	scientific	or	humane	discipline	and	those	who	are	laymen	in	each	particular	
field’	(Mead,	1959).		
	
Improving	scientific	literacy	-	ensuring	that	American	children	were	equipped	to	
cope	with	a	society	of	increasing	scientific	and	technological	sophistication	-	was	
viewed	as	one	way	of	addressing	such	concerns.	Interest	in	the	concept	was	fuelled	
by	concerns	among	the	American	science	community	over	a	lack	of	public	support	
for	science	following	the	launch	of	the	Soviet	satellite	Sputnik	(Luagksch	2000).	As	
Alan	Waterman,	Director	of	the	National	Science	Foundation	noted,	in	a	review	of	
the	organisation	in	1960,	progress	in	science	depended	to	a	‘considerable	extent	on	
public	understanding	and	support	of	a	sustained	programme	of	science	education	
and	research’	(Waterman	1960).	
	
Ortolano,	has	argued	that	the	debate	between	Snow	and	Leavis,	was	far	more	than	a	
“disciplinary	dispute	about	the	arts	and	sciences,”	and	should	be	viewed	as	“an	
ideological	conflict	between	competing	views	of	Britain’s	past,	present	and	future”	
(Ortolano	2009,	p.	1).	Labelling	it	a	clash	between	the	“technocratic	liberalism”	of	
Snow	and	a	“radical	liberalism”	of	Leavis,	these	ideas	were	picked	up	and	shaped,	
British	political	rhetoric.	As	he	documents,	the	most	notable	manifestation	of	this	
permeation	into	politics	is	perhaps	Harold	Wilson’s		first	speech	as	Labour	party	
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leader	in	1964,	in	which	he	alluded	to	the	importance	of	public	understanding	of	
science	in	driving	us	toward	a	technological	future:		
	
“In	all	our	plans	for	the	future	we	are	redefining,	and	we	are	restating,	our	
socialism,	in	terms	of	the	scientific	revolution,	but	that	revolution	cannot	
become	a	reality	unless	we	are	prepared	to	make	far	reaching	changes	in	
economic	and	social	attitudes	which	permeate	our	whole	system	of	society.”1		
	
Continuing	into	the	1970s	a	few	academic	programmes	and	courses	were	
established	to	address	the	best	means	of	achieving	better	scientific	literacy	and	
greater	public	understanding	of	science	(Open	University	1971,	McCarty	1974,	
Perlman	1974,	Rose	2003).		
	
It	wasn’t,	however,	until	the	1980’s	that	concerns	over	the	relationship	between	the	
public	and	science	rose	to	prominence	again	within	the	UK	scientific	community.	The	
Conservative	Government	at	this	time	had	decided	it	had	little	need	of	scientific	
advisors	and	without	the	‘special	status’	that	had	been	accorded	to	prominent	
scientists	in	policy-making,	particularly	those	in	the	Royal	Society,	their	influence	
declined	(Yearly	2000).	The	Conservative	administration	had	turned	away	from	
academic	science	as	a	guiding	influence	on	public	spending,	and	believed	instead	
that	industry	should	know	what	they	needed	in	the	way	of	research	and	
development,	and	should	pay	for	it	themselves.	Members	of	the	scientific	
community	were	faced	with	a	lack	of	support	from	government,	as	well	as	declining	
public	funds,	falling	numbers	of	students	studying	science,	and	a	drain	of	talented	
scientists	to	the	United	States.	The	Royal	Society	sent	regular	delegations	to	meet	
with	the	Secretary	for	Science	and	Education,	who	were	told	that	the	Government	
could	not	afford	to	spend	more	on	science	(Bodmer	2004).	The	scientific	community	
also	perceived	itself	to	be	faced	with	a	lack	of	support	from	the	public	who,	scientists	
felt,	at	best	showed	indifference	to	science,	and	at	worst	were	likely	to	question	its	
uses	and	practitioners.2	As	John	Ziman,	a	leading	physicist,	and	Fellow	of	the	Royal	
Society,	later	reflected	there	had	been	a	concern	within	the	science	community	that	
the	efforts	of	those	scientists	over	the	past	hundred	years,	who	in	his	words	‘had	
made	it	their	business	to	explain	in	simple	terms	what	the	scientists	were	doing’	
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(Ziman	1991,	99),	had	not	had	much	effect.	This	perceived	lack	of	public	
understanding	of	science	by	some	in	the	scientific	community	was	baffling	to	them,	
as	he	recalled:	
	
It	seemed	a	paradox	that	so	many	people	should	have	so	little	understanding	
of	the	science	that	dominates	their	culture.	They	might	find	themselves	quite	
unable	to	make	sense	of	important	practical	questions	affecting	their	lives	–	
small	questions,	such	as	the	goodness	of	eggs;	large	questions,	such	as	the	
safety	of	nuclear	power.	In	fearful	ignorance,	they	might	even	take	against	
science	altogether,	heedlessly	throwing	out	the	baby	with	the	bath	water.	
(ibid)	
	
In	1985	the	Royal	Society	published	their	report	on	the	public	understanding	of	
science	(PUS)	(The	Royal	Society	1985).	The	report	problematised	the	public’s	levels	
of	knowledge	of	science,	and	gave	rise	to	a	variety	of	science	communication	
activities	which	attempted	to	correct	a	perceived	deficit	of	scientific	knowledge	on	
the	part	of	the	public.	How	much	decision-makers	and	their	advisers,	and	the	public	
to	whom	they	are	ultimately	responsible,	understood	the	scientific	and	technological	
aspects	of	each	issue,	and	more	generally,	the	scope	and	limitations	of	the	scientific	
method	were	seen	as	key.	Thus	the	‘Bodmer’	report	argued	that	scientists	had	to	
come	out	of	their	laboratories	and	start	communicating	with	the	public	directly.	It	
has	been	argued	that	this	was	a	break	with	the	status	quo	of	the	previous	decade	or	
so,	where,	with	the	exception	of	a	few	‘visible	scientists’	most	communication	of	
science	had	been	left	to	media	professionals,	and	scientists	were	encouraged	to	
focus	on	their	research	careers	(Gregory	and	Miller,	1998,	Lock,	2011).		Goodell,	for	
example,	has	suggested	that	a	reluctance	to	engage	in	public	communication	had	
been	instilled	in	many	scientists	as	a	tacit	part	of	their	socialisation	into	the	
profession	(Goodell,	1977).	The	major	outcomes	of	the	Bodmer	report	was	the	
formation	of	the	Committee	on	the	Public	Understanding	of	Science	(COPUS).	
Established	in	1986	as	a	joint	committee	of	the	Royal	Society,	the	Royal	Institution	
and	the	British	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Science,	it	was	given	the	general	
aim	of	raising	the	profile	and	number	of	public	understanding	of	science	activities	in	
the	UK,	particularly	among	scientists.	Key	activities	included	setting	up	a	grants	
scheme	to	fund	those	scientists	who	wished	to	stage	science	communication	
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activities,	a	Media	Fellowship	scheme,	the	establishment	of	the	Faraday	Award,	
awarded	to	a	scientist	or	engineer	deemed	by	COPUS	to	have	contributed	
significantly	to	the	public	understanding	of	science	and	a	National	Science	Week.	
Also	central	to	the	PUS	movement	in	the	1980s	was	the	fostering	of	high	quality	
popularisations	and	one	mechanism	to	facilitate	this,	also	set	up	by	the	COPUS	
committee,	was	the	science	books	prize. As	Elizabeth	Leane	has	documented	in	
some	detail,	the	UK	experienced	a	boom	in	popular	science	writing	in	the	early-
1990s	(Leane	2007).	Stephen	Hawking’s	book,	A	Brief	History	of	Time,	and	others	by	
Richard	Feynman,	Stephen	Jay	Gould,	and	Richard	Dawkins	were	published	and	
widely	available.	Leane	documents	how	many	articles	in	the	late	1980s	and	early	
1990s	concerned	with	popular	science	and	popular	science	books	demonstrate	that	
Snow’s	two	cultures	‘barrier’	was	still	viewed	as	a	primary	obstacle	to	the	
popularisation	and	public	understanding	of	science.	
 
For	example,	in	a	1986	article,	“In	Praise	of	Science	Writers”	biologist,	Colin	Tudge	
argued	that	anyone	knowledgeable	about	science	was	subject	to	a	form	of	prejudice	
he	termed	“scientism”	(Tudge	1986).	This	prejudice	was	evident	in	the	media	bias	
towards	the	arts:	
 
Thus	in	the	heavy	Sunday	newspapers,	which	focus	the	proper	concerns	of	
educated	people,	you’ll	find	pages	and	pages	on	the	posthumous	letters	of	Vita	
Sackville	West,	or	the	annotated	laundry	lists	of	D.H.	Lawrence;	but	you’ll	find	
precious	little	science,	past	or	present….	.	Indeed	it	remains	the	case,	just	as	in	
Snow’s	day,	that	to	be	interested	in	science	is	still	somewhat	infra	dig.	(ibid.,	
44)		
	
In	his	concluding	paragraph	Tudge	argued	that	any	“second	Renaissance”	of	science	
in	society	would	require,	among	other	things	“a	little	less	philsitnism	among	the	arts-
trained	moguls	of	“the	meejah”’	(ibid.,	48),	a	sentiment	also	felt	by	members	of	the	
COPUS	committee	and	the	impetus	behind	their	establishment	of	a	media	fellowship	
scheme	to	try	and	improve	journalists’	understanding	of	science.		
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	Michael	Kenward,	a	prior	editor	of	New	Scientist,	put	forward	a	similar	argument	
two	years	later:		
	
The	disregard	for	books	about	science,	not	to	be	confused	with	scientific	
books,	in	newspapers	and	magazines	is	scandalous.	The	“literary	pages”	
happily	publish	interminable	reviews	of	the	laundry	lists	of	members	of	the	
Bloomsbury	set:	no	massive	biography	(auto	or	otherwise)	of	lesser	figures	
escapes	attention,	nor	do	the	trivial	confessions	of	media	“personalities”.	If	
you	are	a	scientist,	however,	the	literary	supplements	will	not	even	consider	
your	book	unless	you	have	a	Nobel	Prize	or	some	new	theory	about	the	origins	
of	life,	the	Universe	and	everything. (Kenward	1988) 
 
Leane	has	suggested	that	for	both	of	these	commentators,	the	“two	cultures’	divide	
was	therefore	current	and	manifested	by	the	literary	community’s	disregard	for	
popular	science	books.	However,	one	can	look	further	afield	than	the	still	relatively	
small	domain	of	popular	science	books	publishing	and	find	scientists	rehearsing	or	
mobilising	versions	of	Snow’s	original	arguments.		The	public	sphere	was	thus	a	key	
battle	ground	for	staking	out	and	defending	the	authority	of	these	cultural	
territories.	Likewise,	the	importance	of	scientific	thinking,	who	is	allowed	to	speak	
for,	and	define,	science	and	who	should	have	a	say	on	what	it	does	were	key	
concerns	of	the	institutional	public	understanding	of	science	‘agenda’.	Scientists	felt	
therefore	empowered,	and	were	encouraged	to	speak	out	on	these	matters	at	this	
time.	
	
The	rhetoric	was	mobilised	in	both	directions.	In	1991,	feminist	author,	Fay	Weldon,	
penned	a	parody	of	a	debate	between	a	member	of	the	public	and	a	scientist	in	the	
Daily	Telegraph	which	portrayed	the	scientist	as	in	need	of	love	and	attention	from	
the	public	and	combating	an	inferiority	complex	when	it	came	to	artists.	Her	
member	of	the	public,	in	turn	accuses	science	of	failing	to	answer	the	important	
questions	about	life	that	the	public	really	wanted	answers	to,	leaving	us	with	a	cold,	
technologically	advanced	but	immoral	world.	Referencing	Snow,	explicitly	they	state: 
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I	am	glad	that	C	P	Snow,	who	back	in	the	Fifties	used	to	lament	the	Great	
Divide	between	the	Arts	and	Sciences,	is	safely	in	his	grave.	It’s	getting	really	
bad.	I	called	a	professor	of	English	Literature	…I	said	‘tell	me	what	you	think	of	
scientists.”	
	
“They	have	leaky	pens,	though	sometimes	pharmaceutical	companies	give	
them	plastic	liners	for	their	pockets.	They	wear	anoraks	in	all	weathers	and	the	
women	wear	cardigans.	They	have	an	eerie	mortality….”’	(Weldon	1991)	
	
Professor	Lewis	Wolpert,	an	embryologist	at	University	College	London	responded	
the	following	week.	As	one	of	a	few	‘visible	scientists’	in	the	UK,	Wolpert	had	been	
active	in	popular	lecturing,	writing,	and	television	and	radio	broadcasting	for	many	
years.		In	his	letter	he	explained	that	he	had	great	difficulty	understanding	why	
Weldon	and	others	like	her,	‘gifted	in	the	arts,	could	be	so	misguided,	even	silly,	
when	it	comes	to	science’	(Wolpert	1991).	The	tradition	was,	he	argued	however,	a	
long	one.	He	equally	drew	similarly	sharp	and	hostile	lines	between	science	and	
literary	intellectuals	in	his	response	to	her	depiction	of	scientists:	
	
It	is	as	discordant	as	image	as	mine	of	feminist	novelists:	woolly	skirted	but	
smart,	publicly	oriented,	quick	to	take	up	the	latest	politically	correct	attitude,	
pious,	overconfident	on	all	matters,	full	of	feeling,	but	low	on	thought.	(On	the	
other	hand,	my	image	seems	to	be	not	so	inaccurate).	(ibid)		
	
At	fault,	to	Wolpert,	was	the	ways	in	which	scientists	were	‘almost	entirely	excluded	
from	anything	that	smacks	of	general	culture,	high	or	low’.	As	he	continued:	
	
whether	in	the	literary	pages	of	journals	or	on	radio	and	television	chat	shows,	
scientists	are	not	there,	and	to	judge	from	the	social	and	obituary	pages	of	this	
and	other	newspapers,	they	rarely	have	birthdays	or	die….	It	is	you	and	your	
“friends”	who	dominate	the	media…	What	you	do	not	seem	to	recognise	is	
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that	you	are	part	of	a	rolling	anti-science	bandwagon	on	which	so	many	in	the	
humanities	jump.’	(ibid)	
	
An	address	by	Neil	Cossons,	Director	of	the	Science	Museum,	published	in	The	
Guardian	the	following	year,	echoed	some	of	Weldon’s	characterisations	of	the	
public	feelings	towards	science,	focusing	on	what	he	perceived	as	negative	cultural	
attitudes	towards	science	and,	one	assumes,	equating	‘fashionable	people’	as	being	
those	without	a	science	education,	yet	in	jobs	of	high	political	influence:	
	
Science	is	perceived	as	part	of	something	bigger,	more	insidious,	threatening,	
inaccessible	and	sinister	…	fashionable	people	want	little	of	science.	And	
people	who	want	to	be	fashionable	people	will	distance	themselves	from	
science	in	case	they	become	tainted.	(Cossons	1992)	
	
In	a	documentary	for	Channel	4	in	1996,	Professor	of	Public	Understanding	of	
Science,	Richard	Dawkins,	similarly	expressed	his	worry	over	the	lack	of	scientific	
understanding	and	toleration	of	such	ignorance.	To	blame	was	what	he	called	a	
“double	standard	in	or	society	with	respect	to	science.”	As	he	continued:	
	
Earlier	this	year	I	was	on	a	late	night	television	talk	show	and	I	mentioned	the	
names	of	Watson	and	Crick	and	the	chairman	promptly	stopped	me	and	said	
“for	the	benefit	of	viewers	who	are	Watson	and	Crick?”.	Now	if	I’d	said	I’d	just	
been	to	the	Cezanne	exhibition,	she	wouldn’t	have	dreamed	of	saying,	“for	the	
benefit	of	viewers	who	was	Cezanne?”.	And	that	double	standard	matters,	not	
that	we	should	value	Cezanne	less,	but	we	should	seek	to	value	science	more. 
(Dawkins	1996) 
	
Two	tribes	go	to	war:	the	UK	‘science	wars’	
	
The	public	understanding	of	science	movement	in	the	1980s	was	as	much	to	do	with	
scientists’	controlling	the	public	narrative,	and	definition	of,	science,	in	particular	
against	what	many	saw	as	a	rise	of	pseudoscientific	knowledge	in	the	public	sphere	
in	the	early	1990s	(Holton	1992).	Concerns	over	the	potentially	subversive	impact	on	
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the	public	of	definitions	of	science	that	were	not	from	the	scientific	community	were	
not	solely	directed	at	new	age	practitioners,	however,	but	were	also	at	the	core	of	
the	conflict	between	many	scientists	and	social	scientists	during	this	period.	Snow,	in	
his	‘Second	Look’	at	the	two	cultures,	had	hoped	that	the	rise	of	social	sciences	
might	develop	into	a	‘third	culture’,	which	would	help	to	bridge	the	gulf	between	
natural	sciences	and	literary	culture.	Yet	the	so	called	‘science	wars’	of	the	1990s	
hinged	around	conflict	between	certain	social	science	and	humanities	scholars	and	
natural	scientists.	The	rise	of	social	constructionism	and	postmodernism	within	
social	sciences	from	the	1960s	onwards	had	not	gone	unnoticed	within	the	scientific	
community.	Though	more	of	a	phenomenon	in	the	United	States,	the	‘science	wars’	
brought	the	field	of	science	studies	(or	science	and	technology	studies	in	the	UK)	and	
related	disciplines	under	scrutiny	and	gave	it	media	attention.	Here	now,	was	a	
professional	and	accredited	body	of	scholars	with	the	explicit	goal	of	understanding	
and	defining	science.	As	will	be	documented	below,	in	the	UK,	many	of	those	actors	
involved	in	public	understanding	of	science	efforts,	both	in	an	institutional,	and	
academic,	context	clashed	over	differing	definitions	of	science	.	It	is	easy	to	
characterize	these	debates	both	in	the	UK	and	abroad	as	an	esoteric	set	of	debates	
about	the	inner	workings	of	science,	played	out	largely	in	an	academic	sphere.	The	
stakes,	however,	were	high:	the	legitimacy	to	define	and	promote	a	definition	of	
science	in	public	and	subsequently	impact	on	the	public	and	government’s	
understanding	and	attitudes	towards	it.		
		
A	few	specific	events	can	be	identified	as	mobilising	and	sustaining	the	rather	larger	
conflict	in	the	US.	First,	certain	scientists,	such	as	Gerald	Holton,	Professor	of	Physics	
and	History	of	Science	at	Harvard,	had	expressed	concern	at	the	Smithsonian	
Institution’s	1994	exhibition	Science	in	American	Life,	and	branded	the	exhibition	as	
anti-scientific,	claiming	it	would	engender	anti-scientific	attitudes	in	its	visitors	
(Gieryn	1999).	The	exhibition,	which	showed	science	in	its	social	and	historical	
context,	had	included	images	of	atomic	destruction	and	chemical	pollution.	It	was	
too	negative	for	its	financial	backers,	the	American	Chemical	Society,	and	they	
disowned	the	exhibition’s	representation	of	science	a	year	later,	blaming	post-
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modernist	sentiments	among	some	of	the	curators	and	members	of	the	advisory	
board.	Picking	up	on	Gerald	Holton	had	left	off,	mathematician	Norman	Levitt	and	
Paul	Gross,	former	director	of	the	Woods	Hole	Marine	Biology	research	station,	
published	Higher	Superstition:	the	academic	left	and	its	quarrels	with	science	(Gross	
and	Levitt	1994).	In	the	book	the	authors	defended	science	against	what	they	
perceived	as	the	‘anti-scientific’	attitudes	proffered	by	what	they	called	an	‘academic	
left’	of	social	constructivists,	cultural	theorists,	feminists,	multiculturalists	and	some	
extreme	environmentalists.	The	book	was	followed	by	a	conference	hosted	by	the	
New	York	Academy	of	Sciences	in	the	following	year	entitled	‘The	Flight	from	Science	
and	Reason’	which	rallied	many	scientists	together	to	decry	these	same	academics	
whom	they	perceived	to	be	taking	up	‘cudgels	against	science’.	Later,	in	1996,	Alan	
Sokal,	a	professor	of	physics	at	New	York	University,	submitted	a	paper	of	what	he	
called	‘outright	nonsense’	for	publication	in	cultural	studies	journal	Social	Text,	as	an	
experiment	to	see	if	a	journal	in	that	field	would,	‘publish	an	article	liberally	salted	
with	nonsense	if	(a)	it	sounded	good	and	(b)	it	flattered	the	editors'	ideological	
preconceptions’	(Sokal	1996).	The	ensuing	debate	centred	on	both	the	intellectual	
rigour	(or	lack	there	of)	of	the	social	sciences,	and	the	ethics	of	Sokal’s	attempt	to	
defraud	a	journal.	
	
In	the	UK	the	conflict	in	the	‘science	wars’	was	a	smaller	affair.	One	of	the	chief	
‘combatants’	was	no	stranger	to	public	debate	in	such	issues,	Lewis	Wolpert,	who	
had	succeeded	Walter	Bodmer	as	Chair	of	the	Committee	on	the	Public	
Understanding	of	Science	(COPUS)	at	the	start	of	1994.	Crucially,	he	had	also	staked	
out	his	own	claims	as	to	the	nature	of	science,	a	year	earlier,	in	his	book	The	
Unnatural	Nature	of	Science	(1992),	which	included	a	chapter	entitled	‘Philosophical	
Doubts,	or	Relativism	Rampant’.	In	this	book,	he	had	argued	that	science	had	a	
problematic	relationship	with	society	because	it	involved	an	‘unnatural’	way	of	
thinking	that	was	in	direct	conflict	with	common	sense.	Therefore,	as	Wolpert	
explained	in	his	book,	‘the	best	and	probably	only	way	to	understand	science	is	to	do	
scientific	research’	(p.	177).	Lay-persons,	he	argued,	lacked	any	familiarity	with	
scientific	thinking	and	science	should	therefore	be	left	for	scientists.	The	implications	
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of	this	statement,	as	Durant	outlined	in	an	editorial	in	an	issue	of	Public	
Understanding	of	Science,	which	contained	several	hostile	reviews	of	Wolpert’s	book	
by	social	scientists	and	historians,	was	that	the	task	of	popularising	science	would	be	
very	difficult,	if	not	‘downright	impossible’	(Durant	1993).	This	was,	as	discussed	
above,	a	period	of	expansion	for	popular	science	publishing	and	Wolpert’s	book	was	
only	one	among	many	which	brought	scientists’	definitions	of	science	into	the	public	
domain	many	of	which	took	up	arms	against	the	social	studies	of	science.	Steven	
Weinberg’s	book	Dreams	of	a	Final	Theory	(1992)	had	a	chapter	entitled	‘Against	
Philosophy”	in	which	he	attacked	contructivism.	Dawkins,	later	also	spoke	against	
‘cultural	relativism’	in	River	Out	of	Eden	(1995)	and	Unweaving	the	Rainbow,	
addressed	what	he	called	the	“hostility	from	academics	sophisticated	in	fashionable	
disciplines”	(Dawkins	1998.	p.20)	
	
This	mobilisation	is	in	part	down	to	the	fact	that	scientists	were	not	now	the	only	
scholars	proposing	definitions	and	explanations	of	science	in	the	public	sphere.	
Taking	a	very	different	stance	to	Wolpert’s	book,	that	same	year	sociologist	Harry	
Collins,	along	with	long-time	colleague	Trevor	Pinch,	published	their	book	The	
Golem:	What	everyone	should	know	about	science	(1992). The	book	had	several	
main	messages,	the	first	of	which	was	an	attempt	to	correct	a	public	image	of	
science	as	something	which	produced	certainty.	This	image,	the	authors	felt,	was	
promulgated	by	heroic	histories	of	science	and	school	science,	neither	of	which	
portrayed	the	activity	of	social	negotiation	that	surrounded	scientific	discovery.	The	
inevitable	product	of	this	sort	of	model	of	science	in	public,	the	authors	argued,	was	
that	science	would	be	viewed	as	all	good	or	all	bad,	which	was	dangerous	and	
misleading:	
	
The	overweening	claims	to	authority	of	many	scientists	and	technologists	are	
offensive	and	unjustified	but	the	likely	reaction,	born	of	failed	promises,	might	
precipitate	a	still	worse	anti-scientific	movement.	Scientists	should	promise	
less;	they	might	then	be	better	able	to	keep	their	promises.	Let	us	admire	
them	as	craft	persons:	the	foremost	experts	in	the	ways	of	the	natural	world.	
(p.	142)	
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Similar	to	many	of	the	scientists	within	the	public	understanding	of	science	
movement,	Collins	and	Pinch	were	concerned	about	anti-science	sentiment,	and	
they	admired	any	attempts	at	disabusing	the	public	about	unsupported	claims.	
Similarly,	the	public	should	still	be	educated,	as	citizens	needed,	they	argued	‘to	
know	enough	to	come	to	some	decision	about	whether	they	prefer	more	coal	mines,	
or	more	nuclear	power	stations’	(p.	144).	However,	they	argued	that	it	was	
ridiculous	to	expect	the	public	to	be	educated	with	scientific	facts,	and	then	be	able	
to	make	better	sense	out	of	science	at	the	messy	research	frontier,	where	all	sides	
had	expertise	‘way	beyond	what	can	ever	be	hoped	of	the	person	in	the	street’	(p.	
144).	Thus,	what	was	different	in	their	formulation	of	PUS,	as	opposed	to	the	more	
traditional	conceptualisation	of	COPUS	and	its	followers,	was	simply	a	matter	of	
what	sort	of	education	was	given	to	the	public.	Rather	than	the	content	of	science,	it	
was	the	relationship	of	experts	to	politicians,	to	the	media,	and	to	the	rest	of	us	in	
which	the	public	needed	to	be	better	educated.	As	they	argued:	
	
To	change	the	public	understanding	of	the	political	role	of	science	and	
technology	is	the	most	important	part	of	our	book	and	that	is	why	most	of	our	
chapters	have	revealed	the	inner	workings	of	science.	(p.	145)		
	
The	book	was	controversial	to	many	outside	of	science	and	technology	studies,	
indeed	Nature	called	it	‘perverse	but	entertaining’	(Gratzer	1993:	22),	and	Lewis	
Wolpert	argued	that	it	presented	a	‘distorted	and	highly	biased	image	of	science’	
(Hendry	et	al	1994).		Yet	a	similar	fashion	to	his	American	counterparts,	Wolpert	
appeared	to	have	found	science	studies	threatening	enough	to	the	public	reception	
of	science	to	devote	time	and	effort	to	what	Gieryn	labels,	‘protection	boundary	
work’;	by	trying	to	deny	the	authority	or	legitimacy	of	science	and	technology	
studies’	academics	in	proposing	their	own	definitions	of	science.			The	fact	that	
Collins	and	Pinch	had	presented	The	Golem	as	a	contribution	to	the	public	
understanding	of	science	(indeed	the	book’s	subtitle	was	What	Everyone	Should	
Know	About	Science)	also	posed	an	implicit	challenge	to	the	dominant	role	that	
scientists	and	institutions	such	as	COPUS	had,	up	until	this	point,	enjoyed	in	
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conducting	activity	in	this	area.	A	line	was	also	being	drawn	between	differing	
approaches	to	PUS,	and	Wolpert,	as	the	Chair	of	COPUS	at	this	time,	was	almost	duty	
bound	to	respond	to	such	challenge.			
	
It	was	in	this	already	heated	and	emotive	context	that	the	stage	was	set	for	Collins	
and	Wolpert	to	meet	at	the	British	Association’s	Loughborough	meeting.	The	
interactions	at	the	meeting	are	good	examples	of	the	boundary	work	being	deployed	
at	this	time	by	scientists	and	social	scientists	to	protect	or	expand	their	cultural	
authority.	It	is	interesting	also	to	note	the	similar	arguments	and	tactics	on	display	
throughout	this	exchange	to	those	seen	between	literary	intellectuals	and	scientists	
during	prior	cultural	clashes.	The	fight	for	epistemic	and	cultural	resources	and	
authority	by	necessity	entailing	the	need	to	define	an	‘in’	groups	and	‘out’	groups,	to	
attribute	deficits	of	understanding,	and	the	decent	into	ad	hominem	attacks.		
	
The	morning	session	at	the	meeting	had	been	arranged	as	a	joint	meeting	between	
the	Sociology	and	Social	Policy	and	History	of	Science	sections	of	the	BAAS	to	explore	
the	sociology	of	science.	Frank	James,	(the	editor	of	this	issue),	as	Recorder	for	the	
History	of	Science	section	was	the	organiser.	In	the	spirit	of	academic	exchange	the	
stage	was	set	for	a	range	of	views	on	the	sociology	of	science.	The	first	two	speakers	
were	sociologist	Brian	Wynne	and	scientist	and	chair	of	the	ESRC’s	public	
understanding	of	science	research	programme	John	Ziman,	to	be	followed	by	Lewis	
Wolpert	and	finally	Harry	Collins.	Ziman,	though	a	vocal	critic	of	the	institutional	
approaches	to	PUS	was	clearly	not	sold	on	all	of	the	claims	the	sociology	of	science	
had	to	offer,	commenting	in	his	note	of	agreement	to	participate	that	he	has	been	
‘trying	to	sort	wheat	from	the	epistemological	chaff	that	spews	form	the	sociology	of	
scientific	knowledge	combine	harvester’	(Ziman,	1993).	Despite	this	scepticism,	his	
presentation,	alongside	Wynne’s	made	different	but	balanced	cases	for	the	role	of	
the	social	in	the	production	of	scientific	knowledge.			
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Wolpert,	in	contrast,	made	it	clear	from	the	outset	his	presentation	would	be	hostile	
to	the	sociology	of	science.	Statements	about	science,	he	argued	should	only	be	
made	by	scientists:		
	
It’s	slightly	odd	giving	a	talk	like	this	as	I’m	not	a	sociologist,	I’m	not	a	
philosopher,	I’m	actually	a	developmental	biologist.		Neverthless	when	one	
reads	some	of	the	comments	that	people	make	now	about	science,	particularly	
from	the	sociologists	of	science	I	feel	more	and	more	incumbent	for	scientists	
to	get	involved	in	this	debate.3	
	
He	was	clearly	very	much	aware	of	the	work	of	Gross	and	Levitt,	recommending	their	
book	in	his	talk	and,	taking	a	very	similar	line	of	attack	as	they	had	in	Higher	
Superstition,	describing	any	comment	on	science	by	those	from	within	the	social	
sciences	as	being	motivated	by	a	resentment	on	their	part:	
	
“What	it	seems	to	me	is,	that	in	some	sense	the	sociologists	have	won.	There’s	
this	curious	view	about	the	nature	of	the	world	and	the	nature	of	science	that	
is	presented	to	the	non-scientific	world	which	is	totally	at	variance	as	to	what	I	
consider	to	be	science	…	what	I	want	to	talk	about	really	are	the	sociologists	of	
science,	who	…	have	not	only	obfuscated,	but	they	have	been	extremely	
hostile	to	science.	And	I	think	that	one	of	the	characteristics	of	the	post-
modern	world	is	that	many	in	the	humanities	have	failed	to	come	to	terms	
with	the	enormous	success	of	science.	Now	that’s	not	a	nice	thing	to	say,	but	I	
regret	to	say	that	it’s	probably	true.”		
	
Social	studies	of	science,	continued	Wolpert,	were	intellectually	bankrupt:	
	
“If	you	are	in	my	field	you	are	wildly	excited,	new	results	are	coming	out	
everyday,	we’re	really	making	tremendous	progress.	I	feel	that	that’s	not	
necessarily	the	case	in	the	sociology	of	science.	I’ve	heard	Brian	Wynne	recycle	
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that	particular	story	of	sheep,	I	think	at	least	three	times	now,	where’s	the	
really	new	evidence?”	
	
What	he	termed	the	‘relativist’	methodological	approach	employed	by	some	
sociologists	of	science	was,	to	Wolpert,	interpreted	to	mean	that	they	simply	saw	
science	as	a	social	construct	and	therefore	not	any	better	a	means	to	understand	
nature	than	any	other	form	of	knowledge.	While	some	sociologists	did	at	this	time	
take	this	ontologically	relativist	position,	many	did	not	and,	as	Collins	pointed	out	in	
his	response,	most	simply	used	it	as	a	methodology,	a	distinction	that	Wolpert	did	
not	make	in	his	general	characterisation	of	social	scientific	views.		
	
His	attacks	on	all	sociologists	as	being	anti-scientific	and	motivated	by	envy,	and	his	
claims	that	their	discipline	was	empty	of	any	evidence,	were,	as	Collins	and	Pinch	
themselves	had	argued	many	years	before,	typical	of	scientists	wishing	to	reject	
anything	they	saw	as	unorthodox,	and	maintain	a	boundary	of	expertise	around	
science	(Collins	and	Pinch	1979).	Furthermore,	by	making	personal	attacks	on	the	
‘accused’	rather	than	engaging	with	the	academic	content	of	their	claims,	Wolpert	
was	explicitly	denying	any	authority	to	those	claims,	and	indeed,	in	another	personal	
slight,	though	it	contradicted	his	earlier	statements,	dismissed	sociology	of	science	
as	“arid”,	“empty”	and	so	trivial	it	did	not	even	concern	most	scientists.	As	he	told	
the	audience:	
	
“If	you	think	that	this	type	of	debate	is	happening	within	the	scientific	
community	then	you	are	wrong.	Scientists,	as	a	community	know	absolutely	
nothing	about	this	whatsoever,	and	have	no	interest	in	it	whatsoever.”	
	
The	attack	by	Wolpert	was	ironic,	given	his	own	interest	and	the	large	amounts	of	
time	he	and	other	scientists	had	spent	engaging	with	social	studies	of	science.	As	the	
video	of	the	session	shows,	it	was	shocking	to	many	in	the	audience.	Several	
audience	members	in	the	question	session	afterwards	criticised	him	for	having	a	lack	
of	understanding	of	sociology.4	John	Ziman	denounced	Wolpert’s	talk:	
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“I’m	not	sure	that	what	Lewis	is	saying	has	much	content	to	it	other	than	
rejecting	a	view	from	his	own	emotional	stance	…	I	am	actually	appalled	by	
Lewis	Wolpert’s	anti	academic	way	of	dealing	with	these	matters,	I	regard	that	
as	really	inappropriate	and	really	rather	scandalous,	and	I	hope	that	he	will	
mend	his	ways.	I	do	think	that	that	is	something	that	we	should	not	tolerate	in	
our	senior	academics	and	intellectuals.”	
	
Harry	Collins,	who	visibly	angry	and	“embarrassed”	as	he	stood	up	to	follow	
Wolpert’s	talk,	accused	Wolpert	of	lying	to	the	audience,	and	attempted	to	defend	
the	sociology	of	science	from	his	charges	of	being	anti-scientific.	He	argued	that	if	
Wolpert	had	actually	spoken	to	any	sociologist	of	science	he	would	have	found	that	
they	were	in	fact	“science	lovers”	who	loved	“nothing	better	than	to	be	in	science	
laboratories,	speaking	with	scientists,	seeing	how	it	works,	trying	to	understand	it.	
He	further	questioned	Wolpert’s	understanding	of	the	field:	
	
…if	you’d	read	books	like	this	more	carefully	you	would	have	read	that	quite	
explicitly	one	of	the	things	that	we	think	we’re	doing	is	trying	to	make	the	
world	a	bit	safer	for	science,	trying	to	protect	it	against	those	who	might	react	
against	science,	because	they	see	the	failures	of	some	of	the	over	the	top	
promises	that	have	been	made.”	
	
Collins	continued	with	a	defence	of	both	the	relativistic	approach	of	sociologists	of	
science	as	a	methodological	principle,	and	the	charge	that	there	was	no	evidence	in	
the	field.	The	defence	was	as	much	a	personal	attack	on	Wolpert	and	his	outdated	
idea	of	science,	as	it	was	a	defence	of	sociology	of	science:	
	
“I’ve	been	asked	to	speak	on	a	platform	with	you	before	and	I’ve	refused	
because	it	seems	to	me	that	what	you’re	engaging	in	is	a	pantomime	act	rather	
than	a	scientific	methodology	…	They’re	[sociologists]	honest,	they	provide	
evidence,	they	argue	among	themselves,	like	cats	and	dogs,	and	we	feel	
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ourselves	to	be	going	into	science	as	Merton	described	it,	although	there	is	this	
slight	irony	at	the	same	time	because	it’s	not	quite	like	Merton	described	it	
and	you	of	course	demonstrate	the	point	quite	adequately.”	
	
Many	of	the	audience	members	accused	Wolpert	of	not	behaving	as	an	academic	
should	and	the	meeting	concluded	with	John	Ziman	urging	the	audience	to	
remember	that	neither	academic	represented	the	scientific	community	or	the	social	
scientific	community	at	large,	and	there	was	a	middle	ground	for	more	fruitful	
discussion.		The	subsequent	THES	coverage	was,	however,	constructed	around	the	
question	of	whether	science	was	a	social	construct,	a	narrow	interpretation	of	the	
debate,	which	also,	in	a	similar	fashion	to	Wolpert,	ignored	the	many	sociologists	
who	did	not	take	this	view.	As	Wynne	had	argued	at	the	end	of	the	meeting,	
“sociological	explanations	of	science	do	not	mean	that	nature	doesn’t	have	a	role	in	
the	construction	of	knowledge”,	yet	the	press	coverage	presented	the	extreme	sides	
of	the	argument.	This,	however,	says	as	much	about	standard	media	practice	of	
reporting	a	controversy,	as	it	might	about	any	particular	stance	the	paper	may	have	
had.	As	sociologist	Hilary	Rose	later	reflected,	this	focus	had	left	little	scope	for	a	
meaningful	debate	about	the	sociology	of	science,	nor	did	it	reflect	the	diversity	of	
opinion	or	approaches	within	either	discipline:	
	
The	options	for	those	sociologists	who	disagreed	with	Collins	or	those	
biologists	who	disagreed	with	Wolpert	(to	say	nothing	of	those	who	as	
feminists	thought	both	were	unreconstructedly	macho	in	thought	and	style)	
were	shrivelled	down	to	the	binary	choice	of	either	Collins	or	Wolpert	(Rose	
1996).	
	
The	coverage	both	prolonged	the	debate,	and	moved	it	further	into	the	public	
domain.	While	Wolpert’s	and	Collins’	positions	were	extremes	the	multitude	of	
replies	to	the	THES	revealed	many	tensions	and	ensuing	boundary	work	between	
certain	science	studies	academics	and	scientists	over	who	had	the	expertise	and	
legitimacy	to	define	and	discuss	science	in	public.	Collins	continued	his	defence	of	
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the	social	studies	of	science	in	the	coverage,	here	resorting	to	similar	ad	hominem	
tactics	to	Wolpert,	branding	the	conflict	a	witch-hunt	and	suggesting	that	the	violent	
attacks	on	sociology	were	a	result	of	a	newfound	insecurity	of	science,	in	a	world	
where	scientists	did	not	enjoy	unquestioned	authority.	Richard	Dawkins	on	the	other	
hand	was	quoted	as	calling	the	sociology	of	science	‘chic	drivel’,	and	accused	
sociologists	of	hypocrisy,	suggesting	that	the	role	of	the	sociologist	of	science	should	
be	limited	to	defending	the	claim	that	scientists	were	influenced	by	their	own	social	
and	cultural	background	(Irwin	1994).	Peter	Atkins,	a	lecturer	in	physical	chemistry	at	
Oxford	University	contributed	a	commentary,	which	argued	that	science	was	
independent	of	society.	Painting	a	picture	of	science	as	progressive,	objective,	and	
universal,	he	argued	that	those	who	suggested	that	science	could	be	any	other	way	
were	‘motivated	by	jealousy	in	one	of	its	disguises	(such	as	political	correctness)	or	
by	a	wish	to	see	science’s	progress	tripped’	(ibid).	Thus,	despite	Wolpert’s	claim	that	
science	studies	was	not	the	concern	of	scientists,	the	coverage	suggests	otherwise.		
Indeed,	this	vocal	response	lent	support	to	an	earlier	argument	by	sociologist	Steve	
Fuller	that	underlying	the	attacks	on	science	studies	was	the	fear	that	the	field	would	
have	‘a	dangerous	effect	on	the	thinking	of	non-scientists	who	make	science	policy’	
(Fuller	1994:	143).		
	
The	Loughborough	meeting	continued	to	perform	as	a	lightening	rod	for	debate	into	
the	following	year	being	described	as	an	‘extraordinarily	vituperative	and	horrible’	
argument	between	the	two	men,	in	the	New	Statesman	(Johnson	1995),	the	popular	
magazine	on	the	left	of	the	political	spectrum	which	incidentally	had	carried	Snow’s	
original	two	culture	piece.	Taking	a	more	sympathetic	view	towards	sociologists	of	
science	than	the	THES	had	done,	the	article	claimed	that	the	debate	had	little	to	do	
with	philosophical	matters,	and	more	to	do	with	scientists	becoming	‘aware	of	a	
public	mood	that	has	turned	distinctly	against	science’	and	‘more	mundane	concerns	
like	status	and	the	contest	between	disciplines	for	a	diminishing	pot	of	funds’	
(Johnson	1995).	Indeed	Wolpert	appeared	to	agree	with	this	view;	sociologists	were	
playing	politics,	(though	incidentally	there	was	no	suggestion	from	him	that	
scientists	were	doing	this	also):	
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They	have	a	political	agenda	…	and	that	is	to	show	that	science	does	not	have	
the	authority	to	describe,	in	any	particularly	reliable	way,	the	external	world.	
By	propagating	this	dangerous	nonsense,	they	are	undermining	science,	and	
since	they	do	not	understand	science,	they	should	be	stopped.	I	think	they	
want	to	get	control	of	science	funding.	(ibid.)	
	
Sociologist	Andrew	Pickering	was	also	reported	in	the	same	article	to	claim	that	
while	scientists	tended	to	think	that	they	knew	how	best	science	was	carried	out,	the	
way	they	presented	the	process	of	scientific	inquiry	was	a	‘story	they	trot	out’	and	
‘nothing	more	than	Sunday	theorising’	(ibid).	What	was	at	stake,	the	article	also	
quoted	one	historian	of	science	as	saying,	was	‘the	right	of	non-scientists	to	
comment	on	the	way	science	seems	to	work’	(ibid),	and,	more	implicitly,	who	was	
allowed	to	popularise	these	views	to	the	public.	Certainly	this	whole	episode	showed	
that	many	scientists	felt	that	it	was	their	right	to	maintain	control	over	their	own	
narrative	and	where	Snow	had	lamented	the	lack	of	influence	and	role	of	scientific	
thinking	on	policy,	here,	the	opposite	seems	clear.	Scientists	were	concerned	with	
losing	the	influence	they	now	felt	they	had	to	a	new	body	of	professional	knowledge	
and	expertise	-	Snow’s	proposed	‘third	culture’	and	were	fighting	to	deny	it	any	
epistemic	authority.	
	
What	goes	around	comes	around…	
	
While	the	events	and	rhetoric	surrounding	the	Loughborough	meeting	should	
certainly	not	be	taken	as	indicative	of	the	stances	and	views	of	all	scientists	and	
social	scientists	(much	as	Snow’s	views	should	not	be	taken	to	stand	for	all	scientists,	
nor	Leavis’s	for	all	literary	intellectuals)	it	neatly	highlights	the	ongoing	boundary	
work	between	some	scientists	and	non	scientists	towards	the	end	of	the	twentieth	
century.	Snow	provided	a	useful	rhetorical	repertoire	for	scientists	and	others	in	
mobilising	support	for	their	side	or	against	another	which	continued	to	be	used	to	
justify	science	communication	efforts	or	to	discount	others	views	about	science	in	
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the	new	millenium.	For	example,	Susan	Greenfield,	Director	of	the	Royal	Institution	
writing	in	The	Guardian	in	2003,	lamented	a	‘widening	gulf’	between	a	science	
cognoscenti	and	everyone	else.	The	public,	according	to	Greenfield,	now	feared	
science,	as	it	became	ever	removed	from	the	ordinary	person.	As	she	argued:	
	
Small	wonder	there	is	a	knee-jerk	to	veto	all	this	confusion	and	scary	
technology	in	one	go.	How	can	Joe	Public,	after	a	hard	day	at	work,	
come	home	and	be	expected	to	tease	out	the	pros	and	cons,	weigh	up	
the	risks,	consider	all	the	implications,	and	differentiate	the	“yuck”	from	
the	reality?	(Greenfield	2003)	
	
	
The	only	way	to	evaluate	the	implications	of	science	was,	she	continued,	to	be	
scientifically	literate.	Science	studies	academic	Jon	Turney,	responding	to	her	
arguments	the	following	week,	claimed	Greenfield,	in	making	the	arguments	for	a	
greater	scientific	literacy	on	the	part	of	the	public,	was	simply	joining	‘a	long	line	of	
well-intentioned	but	not	very	well	informed	scientists’,	who	were	the	only	people	
that	had	believed	in	an	anti-science	movement	in	the	first	place	(Turney	2003).	Most	
recently,	the	prominent	physicist	Professor	Brian	Cox	claimed	that	‘CP	Snow’s	“two	
cultures”	are	still	all	too	apparent	in	today’s	society.”	In	his	endorsement	of	The	
Geek	Manifesto	(2012),	a	popular	science	book	by	Mark	Henderson,	intended	as	a	
call	to	arms	for	all	science	minded	members	of	the	public	to	defend	it	against	
irrational	and	unscientifically	informed	views.	
 
Conclusion	
	
We	can	see	the	legacy	of	Snow’s	two	cultures	debate	continued	well	into	the	
twenty-first	century.	In	particular,	in	and	around	debates	concerned	with	the	public	
understanding	of	science	in	the	1980s.	The	perception	of	and	subsequent	
identification	of	a	gulf	of	understanding	and/or	particular	attitudes	towards	science,	
provided	a	rational	for	scientists	and	scientific	institutions	to	mobilise,	be	this	
popularisation,	education	efforts,	or	attempts	to	raise	public	feeling.	As	we	have	
seen,	however,	this	diagnosis	and	course	of	action	was	not	new	at	this	time,	but	has	
been	an	ongoing	aspect	of	professionalization	activity	for	scientists.	
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Many	of	the	main	actors	in	PUS	were	also	caught	up	in	the	‘science	wars’	of	the	
1990s	which,	in	one	sense	could	also	be	seen	as	a	replaying	of	the	two	culture’s	
debate,	this	time	with	social	scientists	and	cultural	theory	scholars	largely	taking	the	
place	of	literary	scholars.	Though	we	might	also,	as	Leane	(2007)	has	argued,	see	it	is	
a	diagnosis	of	the	two	culture’s	problem,	with	one	side	(science	studies	and	related	
disciplines)	arguing	that	there	is	only	one	culture,	with	science	and	literature	both	
forms	of	“discourse”	with	equal	epistemological	validity	and	scientists	arguing	for	
the	uniqueness	of	science.			
	
This	paper	has	argued	that	we	should	think	about	all	these	episodes	as	rhetorical	
boundary	work,	reflective	of	strains	and	stressors	on	science	as	an	institution.		
Gieryn	(1985,	1995)	argues	that	the	rhetoric	of	scientists	has	been	important	in	
constructing	the	authority	of	scientists	and,	more	broadly,	the	professionalisation	of	
science	as	a	distinct	community.	Indeed,	Luhmann	(1995)	has	argued	that	
communication	is	the	defining	characteristic	of	all	communities,	thus	we	can	apply	
the	same	principle	to	other	professional	groups	literary	intellectuals,	or	social	
scientists.	Within	debates	over	the	two	cultures	or	the	public	understanding	of	
science,	we	should	therefore	consider	all	acts	of	popular	discourse	as	boundary	
work,	with	actors	selecting,	for	example,	particular	attributes	for	science	and	
scientists	or	literary	intellectuals	and	mobilising	them	as	part	of	a	wider	discourse	
concerned	with	professional	expertise,	resource	management,	and	cultural	status.	
	
An	explicit	example	of	this	boundary-work	is	the	so	called	‘science	wars’.	The	rise,	
over	the	latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	of	a	body	of	expertise	–	social	science	–	
that	claimed	ownership	over	the	specific	issue	of	the	science	and	its	definitions	in	
public,	meant	that	the	public	sphere	became	a	key	battle-ground	over	the	legitimacy	
of	these	differing	expertises.	Each	professional	group,	particularly	within	debates	
over	PUS,	defined	‘the	public’	differently	while	attempting	to	align	themselves	with	
it.	The	boundary	work,	as	much	as	it	attempted	to	demarcate	science	and	scientists	
from	non-science	and	non-scientists	also	crucially	served	to	construct	each	
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professional	group	as	‘on	the	side	of	the	public’,	or	working	towards	their	interests;	a	
normative	assumption	that	members	of	each	profession	know	what	is	best	for	the	
public.	For	scientists	this	was	largely	a	continuation	of	what	Gieryn	calls	protection	
boundary	work:	science	is	at	one	and	the	same	time	separate	from	the	public,	yet	is	
also	something	which	can	help	to	restructure	society	and	the	public	for	the	better.	
Here,	many	scientists	argued	for	a	need	to	act	to	save	the	public	from	both	itself	(or	
its	ignorant	uptake	of	‘pseudoscience’)	and	from	social	scientific	approaches	that	
they	felt	undermined	their	expertise	and	objectivity.	Particular	social	scientists,	on	
the	other	hand,	were	engaging	with	their	own	boundary	work,	mobilising	what	they	
believed	was	a	more	honest	and	realistic	construction	of	science,	which	portrayed	
social	interests	as	part	of	the	scientific	enterprise,	and	questioned	the	hegemony	
over	public	authority	that	science	was	perceived	to	hold.		Many	of	these	arguments	
relied	on	broad	stereotypes,	personal	attacks	and	strawmen	arguments	to	be	
effective.	Yet	if	we	shift	our	gaze	away	from	whether	such	claims	are	true	or	false	we	
can,	and	should,	view	these	skirmishes	instead	as	rhetoric;	rallying	cries	and	
manoeuvres	in	a	larger	and	longer	battle	that	has	been	played	out	through	Snow	and	
others’	claims	before	him,	to	establish	or	question	science	as	the	dominant	form	of	
knowledge	in	society	and	delineate	who	is	allowed	to	speak	for	it,	and	wield	its	
power.	
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